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social Crisis in Contemporary ukraine
In search of a New Narrative
on august 24, 2016, Ukraine celebrated the 25th anniversary of gaining 
independence. despite the fact that this country is very young, Ukrainians have 
existed as an ethnic group for many centuries. They lived on the territories that 
belonged to different countries at different times, including The russian Empire, 
poland, The austro-hungarian Empire, hungary, and romania. now, Ukraine 
is one of the largest countries in Europe with the area of 603,500 m2 and popu-
lation of approximately 42 million people. it would seem that a country which 
eventually received the long-awaited independence ought to have responsibility 
to build a strong united society in order to protect its sovereignty, but that did 
not happen in the 1990s. neither did it happen in the next decade. on the con-
trary, Ukraine faced several political and economic crises that, in turn, caused 
the societal crisis that continues to harm Ukraine and its people. 
in 1993, professor Volodymyr lanoviy, who was the Minister of Economy of 
Ukraine, wrote: “i am sick and tired of hearing political leaders say ‘We are just 
beginning, we are trying to learn how to steer Ukraine out of political crisis’” 
(lanoviy 1993: 194). it turned out that this task has become too complicated 
for him and other politicians. instead of uniting the country by introducing a 
common narrative of national identity, several very different narratives started 
to emerge in the 1990s, and now they stand in the way of peaceful and stable 
development of Ukraine.
at first, there were two major narratives – pro-Ukrainian and pro-Soviet 
(pro-russian). as lanoviy wrote in 1993, “in the West of Ukraine, the popularity 
of the national socialists is growing rapidly and the republicans are losing the 
confidence of the population. in the East of Ukraine, the authority and prestige 
of communism is on the rise” (lanoviy 1993: 194). it should not be surprising 
that such polarization of the Ukrainian society took place very shortly after 
the country had declared independence. in the academic literature, there have 
already been many studies proving that sharp economic declines have negative 
influence on people’s preferences with regard to existing economic and political 
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system (de haas et al. 2008: 94). in the early 1990s, an economic crisis harshly 
hit Ukraine, because its economy lost valuable economic ties with russia and 
other countries to which manufacturing enterprises exported their products. 
additionally, the planned economy had to be transformed into the market econ-
omy, and it was not a simple task for Ukraine which had been one of the key 
Soviet republics in terms of industrial production and agriculture. Some large 
monocities, especially in the east of Ukraine, in the donbass region, were built 
in the Soviet times and were a vital node of a complex production network. in 
the 1990s, they had to learn how to survive. Without doubt, the economic and 
social shock must have had great impact on people’s views and a lot of people 
wanted to regain the relative stability that used to prevail in the USSr, even in 
the 1980s, during the volatile years of perestroika.
in the case of Ukraine, it is of great interest to the author of this article, to 
investigate further why people in different parts of Ukraine view similar econom-
ic and political problems differently and why there is no unity in the Ukrainian 
society, despite the fact that the majority of people in Ukraine, which is equal to 
77 per cent, are ethnic Ukrainians. Some scholars write that not only economic 
problems, but also cultural differences may cause a conflict (cited in de haas 
et al.: 94). Therefore, it is worth focusing on whether the cultural differences 
between Western and Eastern Ukraine are so sharp that they do not allow a 
large east-European country to develop further. in this article, several key dif-
ferences will be described and the most popular narratives of national identity 
will be presented. Statistical data from various sources and extensive literature 
review will show that regional differences play a much more important role in 
spreading the societal crisis in Ukraine than belonging to a certain ethnic group 
or speaking Ukrainian or russian language. finally, it will be suggested that the 
ineffective post-Soviet approach to governance, as well as the power of several 
business groups during the first twenty years of Ukrainian independence were 
some of the major factors of the fundamental societal crisis that later resulted 
in the annexation of crimea by russia, and a military conflict in some parts of 
the donbass region, on the border with russia.
to start with, Karácsonyi et al. (2014) described a large number of differences 
between Eastern and Western Ukraine in the article “East–West dichotomy and 
political conflict in Ukraine – Was huntington right?” in the authors’ opinion, 
the dichotomy was caused by ethnic and religious differences, level of urbaniza-
tion, level of economic development, national identity, etc. These differences have 
been shaped for several centuries along the Uman’–Kharkiv line. for instance, in 
the 19th and 20th centuries, eastern Ukrainian regions went through the process 
of rapid industrialization that made them dependent on the russian economy. 
Uneven industrialization also led to the divide between the urban and rural 
Ukraine. Karácsonyi et al. (2014) write that 65 per cent of rural citizens live in 
the western part of Ukraine, whereas almost 80 per cent of the population lives 
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in the cities in the east of Ukraine (Karácsonyi et al. 2014: 120). once again, this 
is because settlements in the east are not as old as the settlements in the west 
of the country. for example, large cities in the east of Ukraine were founded 
as follows: Kharkiv – 1650, donetsk – 1869, luhansk – 1795, odessa – 1794, 
dnepropetrovsk – 1776. as for the major cities in the west of Ukraine: lviv – 
1240, ivano-frankovsk – 1650, ternopol – 1540, chernivtsi – 1408. The same 
trend concerns smaller towns. if in the eastern part of Ukraine many monocities 
were built during the period of industrialization, the settlement network in the 
west of Ukraine was formed in the course of several centuries that preceded 
industrialization (Karácsonyi et al. 2014: 120).
When Ukraine was united under the rule of the Soviet Union, there were 
some common centralized policies, but they did not erase regional differences. 
Moreover, some policies, for example, migration policy, led to the rebalancing of 
ethnic groups in Ukrainian cities. in eastern Ukraine, the number of people of 
russian origin significantly increased, because a lot of workers were coming to 
eastern Ukrainian cities in order to build new factories and plants. Moreover, a 
large number of Ukrainians died during the holodomor and World War ii, or 
were made to migrate to other countries. in western Ukraine, there were also 
significant migrations. after World War ii, ethnic poles had to move to poland 
and ethnic Ukrainians that lived in poland moved back to Ukraine. for example, 
in lviv in 1939, 50 per cent of the population was polish, and only 15 per cent 
of the population was Ukrainian (Mick 2011: 2). during World War ii, the city 
quickly became a vital cultural, historic, and industrial center for Ukrainians. 
additionally, the USSr was trying to integrate lviv and other western Ukrainian 
cities into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist republic. after several decades, 88 per 
cent of the population in lviv was Ukrainian, 9 per cent was russian, and only 
1 per cent was polish (Ukrainian census of 2001).
The most visible cultural differences in Ukraine are language and religion. 
according to the Ukrainian census of 2001, 14.8 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians 
think that russian is their native language. considering the information about 
migration provided above, it is not surprising at all that the number of ethnic 
Ukrainians who speak russian is significantly higher in the eastern regions of 
Ukraine. Up to 60 per cent of ethnic Ukrainians in donetsk, luhansk, and 
crimea think that russian is their native language (cited in Karácsonyi et al. 
2014: 115). in general, Ukrainian language has the state status and is protected 
by the Ukrainian constitution that was passed in 1996. other languages, rus-
sian, crimean tatar, polish, hungarian, and romanian in particular, are used for 
communication by the ethnic minorities that live in different parts of Ukraine. 
Without doubt, russian language is the most widely spread. Very often the topic 
of oppression of the russian-speaking Ukrainians and ethnic russians is used 
by some local politicians, as well as by the russian government, in order to get 
political mileage in Ukraine and abroad.
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in terms of religion, there are many more believers in the western regions 
than in the eastern ones – 86.6 per cent versus 50.5 per cent. Such a difference 
may be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union was not so aggressive in the 
western Ukraine that joined the USSr only after World War ii (Karácsonyi et al. 
2014: 115). additionally, there are more catholics in the west than in the east. 
finally, in order to understand the division in the Ukrainian society in terms 
of religion, it is important to mention that there are two competing orthodox 
churches in Ukraine. There are churches that belong either to the Kyiv patri-
archate or the Moscow patriarchate. according to the official data provided by 
the Ministry of culture of Ukraine, two thirds of the orthodox churches belong 
to the Ukrainian orthodox church (Moscow patriarchate). in turn, there are 
half as many churches that belong to the Kyiv patriarchate (Ministry of culture 
of Ukraine, 2016). paradoxically, the majority of orthodox people in Ukraine 
support the Kyiv patriarchate (razumkov centre, 2016).
The discrepancy in the number of churches may have been caused by two 
factors. The Kyiv patriarchate was established in 1992 and it is unrecognized by 
the canonical orthodox churches at the international level. Thus, it is difficult 
to create an extensive network of churches around the country even though 
there is the public will to do that. Secondly, the Ukrainian orthodox church 
of the Moscow patriarchate has very strong support from the russian ortho-
dox church and influential pro-russian Ukrainian politicians. There have been 
appeals in Ukraine, initiated by the pro-western presidents Viktor yushchenko 
and petro poroshenko, to create a unified Ukrainian church, but it seems that 
at the moment, this idea is not feasible due to the evident absence of consensus 
between the two dominant churches.
one more important difference lies in the way Ukrainians view democracy 
and free market economy in different parts of the country. people who live in the 
east of Ukraine are 35 per cent less likely to support the market-based economic 
system, and 42 per cent less likely to be in favor of democracy (de haas et al. 
2015: 93). What is more, the negative views concerning democracy and market 
economy arose in the east of Ukraine in 2006–2010, due to the economic crisis 
that Ukraine had to overcome (de haas et al. 2015: 93). in 2000–2010, the eco-
nomic situation did not significantly improve, mainly because “institutionalized 
oligarchic capital and clannish power took hold and society became divided into 
the super wealthy and the poor” (Kuzio 2011: 95). Moreover, Ukraine continued 
to rest on the conservative Soviet governance structures and ideologies that did 
not allow active participation of citizens in the national and regional politics 
(Korostelina 2013: 39). both power of the oligarchs and Soviet ideology are 
much stronger in the east of Ukraine, where many large industrial companies 
are located. due to the inconsistencies in the economic system and political 
governance model, it is not surprising that people in the east of Ukraine, in the 
donbas region in particular, are more dissatisfied with the national government, 
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and therefore, would like to have closer ties with russia, in order to reconstruct 
the past when the cities in Soviet Ukraine were benefiting from central planning 
and extensive economic cooperation with russia.
information that was provided above shows that the Ukrainian society is 
indeed diverse and there are regional differences that may have a negative impact 
on the current development of the country. for example, in 2014, after the end 
of Euromaidan and the escape of president of Ukraine – Victor yanukovych – to 
russia, russia was relying on the narrative of oppression of russian coethnics in 
the east of Ukraine and crimea (Metzger et al. 2016: 21). interestingly, during 
Euromaidan, the narrative was different and it concerned the question whether 
Ukraine should be integrating into the Eurpean Union or not. yuri zhukov from 
the University of Michigan states that it would be wrong to “associate terms like 
‘pro-russian’ and ‘pro-Ukrainian’ only with the ethnic and linguistic groups that 
bear their name” (zhukov 2015: 2). he provides an example of the region of 
donbas where the rebels look in the direction of russia not because of their 
ethnicity or language. in his opinion, maintaining close trade ties with russia 
is one of the main reasons why some people in donbass are acting against the 
Ukrainian government (zhukov 2015: 2). barrington and herron (2004) also 
think that very different ethnic groups in Ukraine can coexist peacefully, and 
they call the phenomenon “the dogs that didn’t bark” (barrington & herron 
2004: 4).
however, there might be doubts that this phenomenon could be observed in 
Ukraine starting from 2004, after the end of the orange revolution that brought 
a pro-western politician, Victor yushchenko, to power. There were no direct 
conflicts between people until 2014, but the tension in the political circles was 
rising. president yushchenko was probably the first president in the independent 
Ukraine that tried to deconstruct Soviet mentality. he raised the topic of holo-
domor as another holocaust, and of World War ii in which Ukraine suffered 
not only from the nazi germany, but also from the USSr. however, president 
yushchenko quickly lost his popularity due to the political crisis. in the next 
elections a pro-russian politician, Viktor yanukovych, became the president of 
Ukraine. Under his rule, there was a very rapid return to the simulated democ-
racy and the further weakening of the Ukrainian economy as well as the whole 
political system (Korostelina 2013: 41).
The shift between ideologies in Ukraine may be explained by the presence 
of very different narratives of national identity. for instance, Korostelina (n.d.) 
provides six types of narratives of national identity: dual identity; being pro-So-
viet; a fight for Ukrainian identity; recognition of Ukrainian identity; a multicul-
tural-civic narrative; and a crimean tatars’ narrative (Korostelina n.d.: 7). Each 
narrative has a very strong logical basis and may contradict other narratives. 
Therefore, one narrative cannot be dominant in Ukraine. in addition, a compro-
mise between some narratives is difficult if not impossible to achieve. 
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Korostelina (n.d.) writes that the dual identity narrative is applied to describe 
Ukraine as a state “with a dual identity of two equal ethnic groups” (Korostelina 
n.d.: 7). people who support this narrative may be proud of their russian heritage 
and think that it is the nationalists who caused the tension in the Ukrainian soci-
ety. in their opinion, different regions have very different histories and therefore, 
it is difficult to develop a common national identity (Korostelina n.d.: 7). people 
who support the pro-Soviet narrative would like to change the overall opinion 
about the USSr and recognize both positive and negative aspects of the Soviet 
past. They think that Ukraine should develop a multicultural society and avoid 
one-sided interpretation of history (Korostelina n.d.: 7). 
The fight for Ukrainian identity narrative is based on the idea that Ukraine 
has “a post-colonial, post-genocidal society that was able to survive, preserve 
culture and language, and achieve independence” (Korostelina n.d.: 7). Those 
people who support this narrative think that the country is facing a threat from 
the pro-Soviet or pro-russian population, and from the politicians that are sup-
ported by russia. for them it is important to protect Ukrainian democratic 
values and discredit all the pro-Soviet totalitarian ideals (Korostelina n.d.: 8). 
The recognition of Ukrainian identity narrative describes Ukraine as a coun-
try in which society should be united by the democratic Ukrainian culture, as 
a substitute for the Soviet totalitarian regime. according to this narrative, it 
seems that the tensions in the Ukrainian society were caused by manipulations 
initiated by russia and do not have any real bases. Therefore, Ukraine should 
protect itself from russian influences in all spheres of life (Korostelina n.d.: 8). 
The multicultural civic narrative is based on the idea that the Ukrainian so-
ciety should have a civic meaning of national identity and “reflect multiple voices 
of Ukrainian history” (Korostelina n.d.: 8). finally, the narrative of crimean 
tatars supports Ukrainian independence. people favoring this narrative think 
that pro-russian forces divided Ukraine. Moreover, they think that Ukrainians 
should have a more positive approach towards the ethnic group of crimean 
tatars (Korostelina n.d.: 8).
What could be the possible scenarios for Ukraine based on the narratives 
provided above? andrew Wilson from the University college in london thinks 
that rapid Ukrainization will probably not occur in Ukraine, because there is 
quite a large group of people – up to 30–35 per cent of the total population 
– who consider themselves russian speaking ethnical Ukrainians (cited in pop-
son 2011). These people are very different and may have unalike views about 
Ukrainian culture, history, economic, and political prospects. Starting from 2014, 
one can observe that some people in this group, who live in donbass, support 
the rebels that fight against Ukraine. Wilson suggests three main scenarios for 
Ukraine: a state that is like canada, “with own russophone or Ukrainian Que-
bec,” gradual Ukrainization and consolidation of the society, or continuation of 
the conflict between the overlapping identities (cited in popson 2011).
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however, no matter which scenario will turn out to be true for Ukraine, it is 
important for the government to implement reforms in all spheres, in order to 
resolve the accumulated problems and prevent the further development of this 
“failed state.” international organizations and foreign governments assist Ukraine 
in introducing the reforms. one of them, which is likely to reduce the tension 
in Ukraine, is a so-called decentralization reform. There are two main aims of 
this reform: to improve governance and budgeting at the local level, and to shift 
responsibility from the national level to the local level. additionally, decentral-
ization is an alternative to federalization that was promoted by russia during 
the peace talks that concerned the situation in the donbass region. Ukraine is 
using the model that was applied by poland in the 1990s. if the decentralization 
reform is implemented as it has been planned, the risk of the potential conflict 
between the regions and the center will be low.
Conclusion
The formation of a united prosperous country is always incredibly complex 
and depends on many factors. in terms of Ukraine, it turned out that the coun-
try, unlike the countries of central and Eastern Europe, failed to cope with the 
economic crisis and formation of the new governance system that would not 
rely on the Soviet meaning of power. additionally, the issue of national identity 
became one of the most debatable topics in Ukraine. it is connected with very 
different narratives that for many years co-existed peacefully. “The dogs that 
didn’t bark” phenomenon ended in 2004 when the orange revolution started. 
Since then, it has been clear that people can be divided not only by their pro-Eu-
ropean or pro-russian sympathies. There are much more complex issues that 
may divide people. Some historical issues, including the role of the Ukrainian 
insurgent army in the Ukrainian history, or the positive and negative sides of 
the Soviet Ukraine, are the topics that do not bring consensus to the Ukrainian 
society. What is more, there are several regional differences that include lan-
guage, religion, level of urbanization, ethnicity, and opinions about the market 
or planned economies, which make creation of a common narrative of national 
identity a difficult task.
nevertheless, one could observe the will of Ukrainian people to fight for 
their country in 2014, when crimea was annexed by russia. at the moment, 
Ukrainian government as well as the civil society receive support from their 
international partners and therefore, there are structural reforms and public dis-
cussions which raise controversial issues that have been suppressed for many 
years. it is not clear yet which scenario Ukraine will choose for staying united. 
it is likely that Ukraine will continue its gradual Ukrainization, and balancing 
interests of different regions by means of decentralization, which has already 
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started, will last for several years until the conflict in the donbass region is re-
solved. now, there is a common understanding in Ukraine that it is important 
to avoid becoming a “failed state,” and therefore a lot of severe transformations 
have to take place. to sum up, the way people and the government will view 
history, culture, and diversity in the Ukrainian society will define the future 
scenario of the development of Ukraine.
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